Research

Job Market Paper

• Civilian Loyalties, Curfews, and Legibility in Counterinsurgency.
  • Abstract

    States often implement population control measures to combat insurgencies, but how do they decide where to impose such measures, and how do these policies reshape counterinsurgency dynamics? This study examines curfews—ostensibly nonviolent yet indiscriminate restrictions on civilian movement—as a tool to enhance state legibility and information flows. While curfews improve government oversight, they also disrupt civilian life, creating a tradeoff between security and public backlash. Using Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurdish insurgency as a case study, I find that curfews trigger civilian displacement, which mitigates the state’s information problem by altering the demographic composition of conflict zones. This facilitates intensified military operations in depopulated urban areas. Additionally, I show that curfew deployment is shaped by civilian loyalties: the government imposes more curfews in insurgent-dominated districts and fewer in competitive and government-dominated districts. These findings contribute to broader debates on state control, legibility, and the strategic use of repression in counterinsurgency campaigns.

Working Papers

Drafts are available upon request.

• Pave the Way to Diversion: Increased Saliency of Foreign Policy at the Times of Economic Hardships. (with Efe Tokdemir). (under review)
  • Abstract

    Most research on the diversionary use of force focuses on timing of conflict initiation and target selection, often treating the public as passive observers of the process. This research note challenges this assumption by examining how leaders try to configure most-needed public attention before resorting to use of force for diversionary purposes. We contend that economic downturns that trigger leaders' diversionary attempts require them first to boost salience of foreign policy issues in the eyes of the public. We measure foreign policy salience in U.S. presidential speeches from 1945 to 2019 using a large language model (LLM), and examine its mediating role between economic conditions and aggression in international politics. Moreover, rather than using quarterly or yearly data, we utilize monthly-level data for economic indicators as well as political outcomes to acquire a finer-grained view of causal story. The results are in line with our theoretical expectation, while not supporting existing accounts of diversionary theory: we do not find a direct effect of inflation on use of force abroad; whereas, inflation is positively associated with increased levels of foreign policy salience in presidential speeches, which in turn increases the likelihood of use of force. Our findings suggest that leaders first elevate foreign policy issues rhetorically before resorting to force; and hence, it can be a signal for upcoming aggression abroad. These findings highlight the importance of public priming in the diversionary use of force, and offer a new perspective on the role of presidential rhetoric.
• Reversing Backsliding: Voter Backlash and Elite Defections. (with Hilal Sert).
  • Abstract

    What role can voters play in reversing democratic backsliding? We examine an overlooked channel: credible signals of voter discontent can drive defections from ruling party elites. When voters punish undemocratic behavior, ruling elites may interpret these signals as dissatisfaction and defect to challenge the regime. Using survival analysis with an original dataset on ruling party candidates in Turkey’s legislative elections, we find that backlash against the ruling party, especially after attempts to overturn the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, increased elite defections. Notably, elites with minimal ties to the party’s structure or those with significant public popularity—such as former ministers—were more likely to leave, leveraging their reputations to align with opposition ranks. Our findings suggest that voter signals can weaken ruling parties internally, creating opportunities for opposition to challenge authoritarian tendencies. This highlights the importance of medium-stakes elections as platforms for voters to signal discontent and influence regime dynamics.
• Framing Domestic Extremism: How Labels Influence Public Support for Counterterrorism Measures.
  • Abstract

    How does the labeling of violent domestic groups influence public support for counterterrorism policies? This study examines the effects of labeling, specifically using the terms ``terrorist'' or ``extremist,'' on Americans’ willingness to endorse counterterrorism measures against ideologically motivated domestic violent actors. Using a pre-registered survey experiment conducted in the United States, I find that labeling does not consistently increase support for counterterrorism responses, such as dedicating resources, enhancing surveillance, or conducting counterterrorism operations. Instead, public support is strongly shaped by partisan identity and the ideological orientation of the violent group. Further analysis reveals that these partisan divides are driven by psychological mechanisms, including perceived credibility of the attack, personal risk, and justification of the violence. These findings suggest that elite and media framing has limited influence in the absence of deeper shifts in partisan threat perception, emphasizing the role of affective polarization in shaping responses to domestic extremism.
• Beyond Institutions: How Informal Alliances Shape Public Backing for Military Interventions.
  • Abstract

    How does collaboration with allies shape public support for overseas counterinsurgency operations? While much existing research emphasizes formal institutions like the UN or NATO, this study examines ad hoc partnerships with local, regional, and Western actors. Using a preregistered U.S. survey experiment, I find that collaboration significantly increases support for troop deployments compared to unilateral action. However, it does not shift beliefs about threat, necessity, cost, or likely success. Instead, collaboration appears to function symbolically, resonating most with individuals predisposed toward internationalism, supportive of NATO, or aligned with the Democratic Party. These findings challenge informational accounts of multilateralism and highlight the legitimating role of symbolic cues in shaping public opinion. The study broadens our understanding of how governments can use even informal coalitions to secure domestic backing for military interventions.
• Constituents in Peril: How Non-Violent Government Presence Impacts Insurgent Tactics.
  • Abstract

    Insurgents may risk their constituents' lives and protect themselves by conducting civilian-endangering attacks. Existing scholarship emphasizes the costs of civilian victimization on the responsible warring party. Extending this line of research, I ask under what conditions insurgent groups accept these costs, risking their own constituents' lives. In this research note, I argue that insurgents produce more civilian-endangering attacks when their constituents are more likely to support the insurgency because of a lack of political channels. I test this theory using micro-level event data on construction and violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. I show that the increase in non-violent government presence, such as mayoral offices or government centers, changes the composition of insurgent tactics, leading them to engage in civilian-endangering attacks less within regions densely populated by their constituents. The findings offer a new framework to understand insurgent violence against civilians, emphasizing the need for alternative non-violent channels to reduce civilian victimization.
• Unity on the Pitch, Unity in the State? Football and Attitudes Toward Decentralization.
  • Abstract

    How do major national rituals such as international football matches affect political attitudes on territorial organization? This paper investigates whether exposure to Spanish national team matches influences individual preferences over decentralization and national identification. Leveraging the timing of football matches and a rich panel dataset of political attitudes in Spain, I employ a quasi-experimental design that relies on the as-if random timing of matches relative to the survey fieldwork. I find that exposure to a national match significantly increases identification with Spanish identity and reduces support for greater regional autonomy. The findings contribute to our understanding of how seemingly irrelevant events shape attitudes toward national unity and political structure.

Selected Works in Progress

• Strategic Sabotage: Insurgent Responses to Effective Local Governments in Conflict Zones.
  • Abstract

    Conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns emphasizes the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population to defeat insurgents. However, existing studies, which often focus on the impact of development aid in conflict zones, present mixed evidence regarding the violence-dampening effect of such strategies. Building on this, I argue that insurgents adapt their tactics to undermine local governments that provide effective public services, particularly those that gain support from the population. This strategy involves sabotage, as insurgents target municipalities that deliver better services to prevent them from consolidating local support. Such sabotage tactics can be particularly effective because they provoke security forces to intensify their operations, shifting the focus of the COIN campaign to enemy-centric measures and diminishing the potential benefits of local government services. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, I analyze the 1994 Municipal Elections in the context of the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. My findings show that insurgents strategically respond to the rule of the Refah Party (RP), known for its strong local presence and effective public service provision, by increasing attacks on security forces in districts where the RP narrowly won. These results contribute to our understanding of insurgent tactics by highlighting how they can undermine COIN efforts through targeted violence in response to local governance.
• Foreign Meddling by Adverse Side-Taking. (with Eddy Yeung).
  • Abstract

    Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly popular tool for authoritarian superpowers to influence politics in the international system. This paper conceptualizes a strategy of foreign meddling: adverse side-taking. We argue that foreign rivals can tip the balance of electoral support in favor of their preferred candidate by overtly endorsing another candidate. This strategy can be effective because rivals' endorsement can signal to domestic voters that the endorsed candidate, if elected, will likely make inappropriate foreign policy decisions for their country. To offer a first-cut empirical test of our argument, we administered a pilot survey experiment to American citizens and found that---consistent with the core prediction of our theory---candidates endorsed by US rivals suffered significant electoral backlash. Building on our pilot study, we design and preregister a complementary pair of candidate-choice and vignette-based experiments to unpack the impact, mechanism, and scope of adverse side-taking.