Research

I study the impact of public opinion on counterinsurgency tactics. Specifically, I examine government efforts to avoid public backlash for counterinsurgency efforts both abroad and at home. In a secondary agenda, I study the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy, emphasizing the role of domestic politics in foreign policy making.

Working Papers

• Constituents in Peril: How Non-Violent Government Presence Impacts Insurgent Tactics.
  • Abstract:

    Insurgents may risk their constituents' lives and protect themselves by conducting civilian-endangering attacks. Existing scholarship emphasizes the costs of civilian victimization on the responsible warring party. Extending this line of research, I ask under what conditions insurgent groups accept these costs, risking their own constituents' lives. In this research note, I argue that insurgents produce more civilian-endangering attacks when their constituents are more likely to support the insurgency because of a lack of political channels. I test this theory using micro-level event data on construction and violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. I show that the increase in non-violent government presence, such as mayoral offices or government centers, changes the composition of insurgent tactics, leading them to engage in civilian-endangering attacks less within regions densely populated by their constituents. The findings offer a new framework to understand insurgent violence against civilians, emphasizing the need for alternative non-violent channels to reduce civilian victimization.
• Pave the Way to Diversion: Increased Saliency of Foreign Policy at the Times of Economic Hardships. (with Efe Tokdemir).
  • Abstract:

    Most research on the diversionary use of force focuses on timing of conflict initiation and target selection, often treating the public as passive observers of the process. This research note challenges this assumption by examining how leaders try to configure most-needed public attention before resorting to use of force for diversionary purposes. We contend that economic downturns that trigger leaders' diversionary attempts require them first to boost salience of foreign policy issues in the eyes of the public. We measure foreign policy salience in U.S. presidential speeches from 1945 to 2019 using a large language model (LLM), and examine its mediating role between economic conditions and aggression in international politics. Moreover, rather than using quarterly or yearly data, we utilize monthly-level data for economic indicators as well as political outcomes to acquire a finer-grained view of causal story. The results are in line with our theoretical expectation, while not supporting existing accounts of diversionary theory: we do not find a direct effect of inflation on use of force abroad; whereas, inflation is positively associated with increased levels of foreign policy salience in presidential speeches, which in turn increases the likelihood of use of force. Our findings suggest that leaders first elevate foreign policy issues rhetorically before resorting to force; and hence, it can be a signal for upcoming aggression abroad. These findings highlight the importance of public priming in the diversionary use of force, and offer a new perspective on the role of presidential rhetoric.
• Reversing Backsliding: Voter Backlash and Elite Defections. (with Hilal Sert).
  • Abstract:

    What role can voters play in reversing democratic backsliding? We examine an overlooked channel: credible signals of voter discontent can drive defections from ruling party elites. When voters punish undemocratic behavior, ruling elites may interpret these signals as dissatisfaction and defect to challenge the regime. Using survival analysis with an original dataset on ruling party candidates in Turkey’s legislative elections, we find that backlash against the ruling party, especially after attempts to overturn the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, increased elite defections. Notably, elites with minimal ties to the party’s structure or those with significant public popularity—such as former ministers—were more likely to leave, leveraging their reputations to align with opposition ranks. Our findings suggest that voter signals can weaken ruling parties internally, creating opportunities for opposition to challenge authoritarian tendencies. This highlights the importance of medium-stakes elections as platforms for voters to signal discontent and influence regime dynamics.

Work in Progress

• Civilian Loyalties, Curfews, and Legibility in Counterinsurgency.

• Framing Extremist Domestic Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism. pre-analysis plan

• Allies in Action: Public Support for Counterinsurgency through Collaboration. pre-analysis plan

• Foreign Meddling by Adverse Side-Taking. (with Eddy Yeung).

• Strategic Sabotage: Insurgent Responses to Effective Local Governments in Conflict Zones.