Research

Peer-Reviewed Publications

• Pave the Way to Diversion: Increased Saliency of Foreign Policy at Times of Economic Hardships. (with Efe Tokdemir). Accepted at Journal of Conflict Resolution.
  Abstract

  Most research on the diversionary use of force focuses on timing of conflict initiation and target selection, often treating the public as passive observers ready to take the bait. This article challenges this assumption by examining how leaders strategically elevate foreign policy issues in public discourse before resorting to the use of force. We argue that economic downturns lead to anticipatory rhetorical agenda-setting, through which leaders increase the salience of foreign policy in shaping the conditions under which military actions become feasible. Using a large language model, we measure foreign policy salience in 29,286 US presidential addresses and remarks between 1945 to 2019. Combining these data with monthly inflation and US military interventions, we examine whether patterns in presidential rhetoric are consistent with a rhetorical pathway linking economic distress to the use of force. The results are consistent with our theoretical expectation. Higher inflation is associated with increased foreign policy salience in presidential speeches and heightened salience is, in turn, associated with a greater likelihood of military intervention, while inflation itself exhibits no robust direct relationship with the use of force. Our findings align with the expectation that diversionary dynamics may unfold as a mediated process in which leaders place greater rhetorical emphasis on foreign policy issues prior to the use of force. By highlighting the role of anticipatory agenda-setting, this study offers a nuanced perspective on diversionary conflict and highlights the importance of presidential rhetoric as a key component of foreign policy outcome.

Job Market Paper

• Making Populations Legible: Curfews, Displacement, and Counterinsurgency in Turkey. R & R at Journal of Peace Research.
  Abstract

  States frequently employ population-control measures to combat insurgencies, yet we know little about where these tactics are used or how they reshape counterinsurgency dynamics. This study examines curfews--nonviolent yet indiscriminate restrictions on civilian movement--as tools for reshaping the operational environment in contexts of limited information. While curfews increase government oversight, they also disrupt daily life, generating a tradeoff between security benefits and political costs. Using Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), I show that curfews are associated with civilian displacement, leaving behind populations that security forces interpret as more insurgent-aligned. This dynamic simplifies how remaining populations are treated in practice and is accompanied by increases in urban counterinsurgency operations. Finally, consistent with the tradeoff argument, curfew exposure is greatest in insurgent-dominated districts, where security incentives are high and political costs are comparatively low, and more limited in contested or government-dominated districts, where governments risk alienating politically valuable civilians or have less need for broad coercive measures. These findings contribute to debates on state control, legibility, and the strategic use of repression in counterinsurgency campaigns.

Working Papers

• The Electoral Consequences of Foreign Side-Taking in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry. (with Eddy Yeung). R & R at American Journal of Political Science.
  Abstract

  Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly popular tool for authoritarian powers to influence politics in the international system. One direct form of intervention is overt side-taking, a meddler's explicit verbal endorsement of a domestic candidate. This paper unpacks its impact on domestic electoral dynamics. We theorize a kiss-of-death logic: overt side-taking by a foreign rival will generate electoral backlash against the endorsed candidate. Consistent with this claim, a preregistered experiment administered to American voters shows that candidates endorsed by a US rival suffered significant electoral backlash, especially among respondents holding strong geopolitical concerns about the rival. Additional evidence, including an original survey designed to probe the mechanisms, indicates that such backlash exists because rivals' endorsement can signal to domestic voters that the endorsed candidate, if elected, will likely make unfavorable foreign policy decisions. Our findings suggest that foreign rivals can exploit the kiss-of-death logic and tip the balance of electoral support in favor of their preferred candidate through words alone.
• Insurgent Sabotage of Effective Local Governments: Evidence from Turkey. R & R at Journal of Peace Research.
  Abstract

  Conventional counterinsurgency theory holds that effective local governance should reduce insurgent violence by weakening civilian allegiance to armed groups. Yet insurgents are not passive observers of governance improvements. I argue that when municipal control shifts to parties with strong service-delivery capacity, insurgents strategically escalate violence to prevent declining popular support. In particular, they increase attacks on security forces to provoke coercive counterinsurgency responses that alienate civilians from the state, thereby undermining the political benefits of improved public goods provision. I test this argument in the context of Turkey’s long-running conflict with the PKK, focusing on the 1994 municipal elections in which the Refah Party (RP) gained control in several Kurdish-majority districts. Using a close-election regression discontinuity design, I show that districts narrowly won by the RP experienced significantly higher levels of PKK attacks on security forces. This pattern is consistent with a sabotage–provocation mechanism in which insurgents respond to capable local governance by inducing enemy-centric counterinsurgency. These findings advance research on political violence by conceptualizing local governments as autonomous actors in counterinsurgency and linking literatures on development aid and provocation.
• Beyond Institutions: How Informal Alliances Shape Public Backing for Military Interventions. R & R at Foreign Policy Analysis.
  Abstract

  How does collaboration with foreign partners shape public support for overseas counterinsurgency operations? While existing research emphasizes the role of formal institutions such as NATO or the United Nations in legitimizing military action, contemporary interventions frequently rely on ad hoc coalitions assembled outside formal institutional frameworks. Using a preregistered survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of U.S. respondents, I examine whether cooperation with informal coalition partners increases support for deploying ground troops abroad. The results show that collaboration with foreign partners—including local forces, regional allies, and traditional third-party partners—significantly increases support for counterinsurgency operations relative to unilateral action. This effect appears across different types of partners and is strongest among individuals with more internationalist orientations and favorable views of NATO. Additional analyses show that collaboration increases support without consistently altering perceptions of threat, necessity, anticipated costs, or the likelihood of mission success. These findings demonstrate that even informal coalition partners can shape domestic support for military intervention.
• Signals of Vulnerability: Electoral Defeat and Coordinated Elite Defection in Turkey. (with Hilal Sert). Under review.
  Abstract

  How do electoral defeats affect elite cohesion in competitive authoritarian regimes? We argue that electoral defeats provide a public signal of incumbent vulnerability, which may potentially undermine ruling-party cohesion. Dissatisfied elites, who hesitate to defect when exit is costly and they are uncertain whether others will follow, may recognize weaknesses in the regime. An electoral defeat can provide a focal point for coordinated exit by reducing this uncertainty. We examine this argument using an original dataset of 2,529 parliamentary candidates from Turkey's ruling AKP. Following the opposition's decisive victory in the June 2019 rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election, the incidence of elite defection increased sharply, with the increase concentrated in the months immediately following the election. We also find that this increase is concentrated in coordinated rather than independent defections. The incidence of coordinated defection rises sharply after the rerun, whereas independent defection does not increase. These findings provide consistent evidence with the argument that elections can reveal incumbent vulnerability and facilitate coordination among ruling-party elites in competitive authoritarian regimes.
• Partisan Alignment and Public Responses to Domestic Political Violence. Available at request.
  Abstract

  How do partisan alignment and categorical labels shape public responses to domestic political violence? I field a preregistered survey experiment with 1,689 U.S. adults varying a violent group's ideology and whether it is described as extremist, terrorist, or left unlabeled. Partisans evaluate violent groups through ideological lenses: violence associated with the opposing camp appears more believable and personally threatening, while relative leniency toward an aligned group appears mainly among Democrats. Policy responses display a more asymmetric pattern. Republicans are more supportive than Democrats across all outcomes when the group is left-wing. When the group is right-wing, Republican support declines and Democratic support rises, narrowing but not reversing the partisan gap. This convergence is clearest for additional resources, more suggestive for surveillance and counterterrorism operations. The extremist label does not increase support for any response, while the terrorist label increases support only for a counterterrorism operation. The findings show that partisan evaluations of violent actors and preferences over state responses do not move in parallel, while categorical labels have little influence on counterterrorism preferences.
• Political Channels and Civilian Behavior in Armed Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. Available at request.
  Abstract

  How is the use of institutional political channels associated with civilians’ political alignment and behavior in the context of armed conflict? Existing research emphasizes violence, territorial control, identity, and material incentives as drivers of civilian behavior. However, less attention has been paid to the role of institutional political inclusion. I argue that use of institutional political channels, such as petitioning officials, contacting elected representatives, or engaging municipal authorities, is closely related to whether civilians perceive the state as a legitimate political representative rather than insurgent organizations. Using nationally representative survey data from Colombia collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) between 2005 and 2011, I show that individuals who report using institutional political channels express greater relative support for the national government compared to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). These individuals also exhibit higher levels of state-centered political participation and greater support for negotiated solutions to the armed conflict rather than exclusive reliance on military force. The findings highlight systematic associations between institutional political inclusion and civilian attitudes and behavior during armed conflict.

Selected Works in Progress

• Democracy Promotion or Foreign Meddling? Public Reactions to Pro-Democratic Electoral Intervention. (with Eddy Yeung).

• Counterterrorism Checkpoints and Civilian Perceptions.

• Relative Military Capabilities and Public Support for Retaliation Against Rebel Sponsors. (with Hilal Sert).